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Invisible Trojan-horse attack
Shihan Sajeed1,2, Carter Minshull1,3, Nitin Jain4 & Vadim Makarov3,1,2
We demonstrate the experimental feasibility of a Trojan-horse attack that remains nearly invisible to 
the single-photon detectors employed in practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, such as 
Clavis2 from ID Quantique. We perform a detailed numerical comparison of the attack performance 
against Scarani-Ac´ın-Ribordy-Gisin (SARG04) QKD protocol at 1924 nm versus that at 1536 nm. The 
attack strategy was proposed earlier but found to be unsuccessful at the latter wavelength, as reported 
in N. Jain et al., New J. Phys. 16, 123030 (2014). However at 1924 nm, we show experimentally that the 
noise response of the detectors to bright pulses is greatly reduced, and show by modeling that the same 
attack will succeed. The invisible nature of the attack poses a threat to the security of practical QKD if 
proper countermeasures are not adopted.
Quantum cryptography allows two parties, Alice and Bob, to obtain random but correlated sequences of bits 
by exchanging quantum states1–3. The bit sequences can then be classically processed to get shorter but secret 
keys. The security of the key relies on the fact that an adversary Eve cannot eavesdrop on the exchange without 
introducing errors noticeable to Alice and Bob. This constitutes a solution to the problem of key distribution in 
cryptography, and is better known as quantum key distribution (QKD).
The security of keys distributed over the ‘quantum channel’ connecting Alice and Bob can be validated by a 
theoretical security proof. If the amount of errors observed by the two parties exceed a certain threshold, they 
abort the QKD protocol. Conversely, if the incurred quantum bit error rate (QBER) is below the abort threshold 
Qabort, the protocol guarantees that Eve cannot know the secret key, except with a vanishingly small probability3.
However, due to discrepancies between theory and practice, the operation of the QKD protocol may be manip-
ulated by Eve in order to gain information about the key without introducing too many errors. Such discrepancies 
can arise due to imperfections in the physical devices used in the implementation and/or incorrect assumptions 
in the theoretical security proofs3–5. The field of ‘quantum hacking’ investigates practical QKD implementations 
to find such theory-practice deviations, demonstrate the resultant vulnerability via proof-of-principle attacks, 
and propose countermeasures to protect Alice and Bob from Eve. Over the years, many vulnerabilities have been 
discovered and attacks have been proposed and demonstrated on both commercial and laboratory QKD systems; 
see refs 6–8 for reviews. In most cases, it was shown that under attack conditions, the QBER Q ≤ Qabort but Eve’s 
knowledge of the secret key was substantially larger than the predictions of the security proof.
In the so-called Trojan-horse attack9 (introduced as a ‘large pulse attack’ a few years before10), Eve probes 
the properties of a component inside Alice or Bob by sending in a bright pulse and analyzing a suitable 
back-reflected pulse. This attack was recently demonstrated11 with the intention to breach the security of the 
Scarani-Acín-Ribordy-Gisin QKD protocol (SARG04)12 running on the commercial QKD system Clavis2 from 
ID Quantique13. SARG04 is a four-state protocol that is equivalent to the Bennett-Brassard QKD protocol (BB84)1 
in the quantum stage. Their difference comes in the classical processing stage: in SARG04, the bases selections 
of Bob are used for coding the secret bits, unlike in BB84 where they are publicly revealed. Therefore, if Eve 
surreptitiously gets information about Bob’s bases selections at any time, she can compromise the security of the 
QKD system running SARG04. (In contrast, a Trojan-horse attack on Bob running the BB84 protocol is normally 
useless10, unless it is combined with other attacks14–16).
In the attack demonstration11, it was shown that getting the bases’ information in a remote manner was indeed 
possible via homodyne measurement of the back-reflected photons. The path taken by these photons at 1550 nm, 
as depicted by the green dotted line in Fig. 1, traverses Bob’s phase modulator (PM) twice. The homodyne meas-
urement thus allowed discerning the phase applied by Bob, which is equivalent to knowing his basis selection. 
This ‘phase readout’ was accurate in >90% cases even when the mean photon number of the back-reflected pulses 
was ≈3.
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Despite that, an overall attack on the QKD system did not have a chance to succeed owing to a side effect pro-
duced when the bright pulses went on to hit the detectors D0 and D1, as may be visualized in Fig. 1. To elaborate, 
the bright pulses result in a severe afterpulsing in these InGaAs/InP single-photon detectors (SPDs), which are 
operated in a gated mode. For a single bright pulse that hits D1, even if well outside a gate, the cumulative proba-
bility of a spurious detection event due to afterpulsing crosses 40% (which is ~4 times the detection probability of 
a single photon) in just 5 gate periods18. The resulting detection events (clicks) are accidental, i.e., erroneous in 
half of the cases. Hence, only a handful of Trojan-horse pulses (THPs) suffice to rapidly elevate the number of 
erroneous clicks and make the QBER surpass Qabort, even though Eve’s actual knowledge IE
act of the key is still quite 
small. An elaborate attack strategy to improve IE
act was proposed and numerically simulated, however, it could also 
not simultaneously satisfy Q ≤ Qabort together with >I IE E
act est, where IE
est is the estimated (theoretical) security 
bound on Eve’s knowledge that Clavis2 uses to produce the final secret key11. While ref. 11 did not prove that a 
better attack could not be constructed, the attack proposed failed in practice by a large margin.
In this Article, we provide experimental evidence that this Trojan-horse attack could however succeed if Eve 
were to craft bright pulses at a wavelength where the afterpulsing experienced by the SPDs is considerably lower. 
The underlying physics is that photons with energy lower than the bandgap of the SPD absorption layer mate-
rial (InGaAs) mostly pass the material unabsorbed, thereby causing negligible afterpulsing. Indeed, we confirm 
experimentally that at a relatively longer wavelength λl = 1924 nm, the SPD has much less afterpulsing than at 
λs = 1536 nm (similar to the wavelength used in ref. 11). We then perform a numerical comparison of the attack 
conditions and performance at λl with these at λs. By means of an optimized simulation that assumes fairly realis-
tic conditions, we show that the actual attack at λl can break the security of Clavis2. The attack in itself is general 
enough to be potentially applicable to most discrete-variable QKD systems, and can be categorized with those 
that exploit vulnerabilities arising from the wavelength-dependence of optical components19, 20.
Experiment
While using λl = 1924 nm for the attack offers the benefit of reduced afterpulsing, the transmittance and reflec-
tance properties of different optical components inside Bob vary greatly in comparison with those measured at 
λs = 1536 nm. Most relevant to the attack, the attenuation is generally higher; for instance, the optical loss through 
the PM at λl is 20dB higher than that at λs. Furthermore, the modulation itself varies with λ since the modula-
tor’s half-wave voltage is a function of wavelength. If Eve uses light at λl to estimate Bob’s randomly modulated 
phase (ϕB = 0 or π/2 at λs) through the homodyne measurement of a pulse that made a single pass through the 
PM, the measurement outcomes will not be on orthogonal quadratures.
Altogether, it is thus likely that compared to ref. 11, Eve would not only need to inject a larger mean photon 
number μE→B into Bob, but may also require a higher mean photon number μB→E in the back-reflection for suc-
cessful homodyne measurements. To calculate the efficacy of the attack, we experimentally quantify at λl (relative 
to λs) the following three aspects: increased attenuation, altered phase modulation, and decreased afterpulsing. 
Figure 1 shows a schematic of the experimental setup used for various measurements.
Increased attenuation. To gauge the increase in attenuation, we measured the optical loss of various com-
ponents of Bob at both λs and λl. In Fig. 1, the dotted line (path X–Y– ☆Z –Y–X, where ☆ indicates the source of 
reflection) shows the attack path used in ref. 11. Relevant loss values are given in the left column of Table 1. With 
a round trip loss of λ λ λ= + Γ + = .− − − − − −☆ ☆L L L( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 58 7Z s s sX Y Y X X Y Z Y Z  dB, Trojan-horse pulses 
injected with μE→B ≈ 2 × 106 photons yielded μB→E ≈ 4 photons in the back-reflection from Bob. Here, 
Γ = .☆ 51 7Z  dB is the loss during reflection at Z, the fiber connector after Bob’s PM.
For an attack at λl with Trojan-horse pulses traversing the same path, the round trip loss would be 
λ = .− − − −☆L ( ) 104 9dBZ lX Y Y X  (with the further assumption that Γ ☆Z  is independent of wavelength). The attack 
pulses at λl would therefore face 46.2 dB more attenuation than at λs. A major contribution to this large attenua-
tion is from the PM, which even gets doubled since the THPs travel through the PM twice.
BobEve
φB
PBS
X
ZY
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Laser
PM
D1
Bob’s gates
PCTrojan
laser
Pulse
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Attack paths
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Figure 1. Basic experimental schematic and attack paths at λs = 1536 nm and λl = 1924 nm. The scheme and 
operation of Bob’s setup is described in detail in refs 13 and 17. The stars indicate the back-reflection sources 
exploited in ref. 11 and in this work. Trojan laser models: Eblana Photonics EP1925-DM-B06-FA at λl and 
Alcatel 1905 LMI at λs. OI, optical isolator; PC, polarization controller; PBS, polarizing beamsplitter; BS, 50:50 
beamsplitter; C, circulator; D, single-photon detectors; X, Y, Z, bulkhead fiber-optic connectors.
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However, since a single pass can also yield information about ϕB, Eve can opt for a different route where only 
either the input forward-traveling THP or the back-reflected pulse passes through Bob’s PM. All Eve requires is a 
reasonably large source of reflection from any component after the 50:50 beamsplitter (BS). Indeed, during our 
loss measurements at λl we observed a large attenuation through the optical circulator (C), a part of which stems 
from a rather generous back-reflection. We estimated the loss λ− −☆L ( )lZ C X  for the path Z–
☆C –X (via BS twice 
and polarizing beamsplitter once) using a photon-counting method, described below.
We temporarily connected the polarization-controlled output of the 1924 nm laser at Z to send light towards 
the BS. The average power of the pulsed laser, operated at 5 MHz repetition rate, was Pavg = 21.55 μW, correspond-
ing to a mean photon number per pulse μZ = 4.14 × 107. An SPD was connected at X to detect the back-reflections 
from C. To prevent other back-reflections from contributing to the photon counts, Bob’s laser and detectors D0 
and D1 were disconnected, and the patchcords (with open connectors) were coiled on a pencil to strongly atten-
uate the propagating light.
Two counters (Stanford Research Systems SR620) were used to measure the number of optical pulses sent by 
the laser N = 4.98 × 106 and the number of pulses received by the detector n = 323 maximized over input polari-
zation at Z. The mean photon number per pulse at X was estimated as μX ≈ 59.7 from the relation,
µ η− = − ≈µ η−n d
N
e1 , (1)X D
X d
where d = 60 is the number of dark counts and ηD = 8.85 × 10−7 is the single-photon detection efficiency at λl, 
which was estimated in a separate experiment similar to the one in ref. 20. The ratio of the mean photon numbers 
μZ/μX provides the overall loss λ ≈ .− −☆L ( ) 58 4lZ C X  dB. The dashed line in Fig. 1 shows the complete attack path. 
Eve’s THPs from the quantum channel enter the long arm of Bob, pass through the modulator, and after a reflec-
tion from the BS, propagate to the circulator. Here, they get back-reflected and then take the short arm to exit Bob, 
passing through the BS again. Using Table  1, this path can be characterized by a total loss 
λ λ λ λ= + + = .− − − − − − − −☆ ☆L L L L( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 85 0dBl l l lX Y Z C X X Y Y Z Z C X .
As noted above, the value of μX was polarization-sensitive. For the worst input polarization, μX decreased by 
7.4 dB, changing the overall loss to λ = .− − − −☆L ( ) 92 4dBlX Y Z C X . For the rest of the paper, we shall assume the 
attack pulses to be in a polarization midway between the best and the worst, leading to a loss figure of 
λ = .− − − −☆L ( ) 87 3dBlX Y Z C X  used to decide Eve’s photon budget. In terms of photon numbers, this implies that 
in order to get the same number of photons out from Bob (i.e., μB→E ≈ 4), Eve needs to inject ρ = 10(−58.7+87.3)/10 = 
7.24 × 102 times more photons at λl than at λs.
Altered phase modulator response. We now explain an impact of the altered phase modulation experi-
enced by Eve’s THPs at λl as they travel through Bob’s PM. As mentioned before, Bob randomly chooses between 
voltages V0(=0) or Vπ/2 to apply a phase ϕB = 0 or π/2 on Alice’s incoming quantum signal at (or in the vicinity 
of) λs = 1536 nm. Eve’s objective is to learn ϕB. The double pass through the PM in ref. 11 implied that Eve had 
to discriminate between a pair of coherent states with angle θ(λs) ≡ θs = 2 × π/2 = π between them, as illustrated 
in Fig. 2(a). At λl = 1924 nm, the phase modulator is expected to lose efficiency and provide less phase shift at 
the same voltage. Furthermore, Eve’s THP only traverses it once. Assuming a linear response of the PM, one can 
calculate the angle θl = [Vπ/2(λs)/Vπ/2(λl)] × π/2 between the coherent states available to Eve.
Since the half-wave voltage of the PM at 1924 nm was not specified by the manufacturer, we experimentally 
measured it. We constructed a balanced fiber-optic Mach-Zehnder interferometer, incorporating the path X–Z 
(Fig. 1) into one of its arms. We applied a square modulation voltage to the PM, and observed interference fringes 
at the output port of the interferometer. We adjusted the voltage amplitude until it was causing no light modula-
tion at the output port, indicating an exact 2π phase shift. From this, we found that Vπ/2(λl) = 5.7 V. By the same 
method with the 1536 nm laser, we found Vπ/2(λs) = 3.35 V.
From this measurement, we calculated θl ≈ 0.294π < θs. The increased overlap between the two states |α〉 and 
|β〉 with |α| = |β|, as depicted in Fig. 2(b), would make discrimination between Bob’s choices of ϕB more diffi-
cult. Eve can however increase the brightness of the injected Trojan-horse pulse: this would elicit a higher mean 
photon number in the back-reflection, effectively translating the states farther from the origin to diminish the 
overlap. The increment factor that makes the distance between the states at λl equal to that at λs is given by
Paths & points Loss at λs (dB) Loss at λl (dB)
X–Y 0.9 3.6
Y–Z 2.6 23.0
☆Z 51.7
Z– ☆C –X 58.4 to 65.8 (polarization-dependent)
X–D0 8.8 (via long arm) 15.5 (via short arm)
X–C–D1 9.2 (via long arm) 25.8 (via short arm)
Table 1. Comparison of optical losses in Bob at λs versus λl. See Fig. 1 for location of the paths and points. The 
loss during reflection Γ ☆Z  was measured at 1550 nm11, which we consider to be close enough to our 
λs = 1536 nm.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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implying that a mean photon number μB→E ≈ 20 at λl would ensure a close-to-unity probability in the phase 
readout11.
Decreased afterpulse probability. To quantify the decrease in the afterpulse probabilities in Bob’s detec-
tors, we used the setup shown in Fig. 1. A single THP was synchronized to the first in a series of detection gates11, 18  
of Bob, and the times at which clicks occurred in the onward gates were then recorded. The delay of the THP 
relative to the first gate was adjusted such that the pulses going through Bob’s long arm hit the detectors just a few 
nanoseconds after the gate was applied by Bob. Although we did utilize a polarization controller, only a maximum 
of ~45% of the incoming optical power at λl could be routed through the long arm. The remaining light, after 
having suffered propagation losses through the short arm, hit D0 and D1 around 50 ns before the first gate (prop-
agation time through the short arm is ≈50 ns faster than the long arm in Clavis217). These light pulses before the 
gate were found to be the dominant cause for increased noise in the detectors.
Figure 3 shows the time distribution of counts recorded in detector D0 at the wavelengths λs and λl. Each of 
the histograms was prepared by recording 106 counts. To make the most of the limited number of histogram bins 
in the counter (SR620), each bin was 0.4 μs wide and included counts from two consecutive gates. This allowed us 
to cover a time range of >80 μs. THPs with mean photon numbers μs = 2.68 × 104 and μl = 8.32 × 107 were used 
for wavelengths λs and λl respectively. Despite µ µs l, the data acquisition for the latter took much longer, indi-
cating that most of the clicks were actually (thermal) dark counts. The number of counts per bin settled down at 
a constant value, representing dark counts, after ~40 μs (right half of the histogram). The total number of thermal 
dark counts collected could then be calculated by multiplying this value by the total number of bins in the entire 
histogram. All remaining counts could then be attributed to afterpulsing. Table 2 lists these counts at the two 
wavelengths. The afterpulse counts (ApC) make the bulk of the counts at λs, while dark counts (DC) are in the 
majority at λl.
It can also be observed in Fig. 3 that afterpulsing decay profile at both wavelengths is roughly similar, however 
the ratio of longer to shorter lifetime components is slightly larger at λl. Although this would help our modeled 
attack11, for simplicity we have conservatively assumed that the decay parameters at λl are the same as at λs18, aside 
from different overall afterpulse probability. The decay parameters and Z★ were measured at 1550 nm11, 18, which 
we consider to be close enough at our wavelength λs = 1536 nm.
To compute a numerical factor γ that compares the afterpulsing noise induced at the two wavelengths, we first 
take the ratio (ApC/DC) at each wavelength. Then, assuming the dark count probability per detector gate stayed 
constant between the two measurements, we take a ratio of these ratios. We assume a linear scaling of the after-
pulse probability with the energy of the THP, and further normalise for the dissimilar mean photon numbers μs 
and μl of the THPs. The numerical factor is then
γ
µ
µ
= = . × .−
ApC DC
ApC DC
( / )
( / )
2 83 10
(3)
s
l
l l
s s
6
In other words, a photon at λl is only 2.83 × 10−6 times as likely to cause an afterpulse as a photon at λs.
Attack modeling and discussion. Relative to λs, an attack at λl can thus effectively decrease the afterpuls-
ing probability in D0 by
δ ρνγ= = . × .−1 03 10 (4)0
2
The factor ρν = 3.65 × 103 combines the results discussed previously on the aspects of increased attenuation 
and altered phase modulation, which required THPs injected into Bob at λl to be ρν times brighter than at λs to 
ensure optimal attack performance.
p
x x
p(a) (b)
Figure 2. Illustrative phase space representation of the back-reflected states. Eve attempts to discern ϕB = 0 or 
π/2 by performing optimal detection on the back-reflected weak coherent states |α〉 and |β〉 that have a non-
zero overlap. (a) The complex amplitude β α α= = −θei s , as a result of the double pass at the attack wavelength 
of λs. (b) β α= θei l, as a result of the single pass at λl through Bob’s modulator.
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To calculate the afterpulsing probability for D1, one must also consider different losses from Bob’s entrance 
to detectors D0 and D1 for the two attack paths (via the long arm at λs and short arm at λl, as shown in Fig. 1). 
We minimised LX−Y(λl) by adjusting input polarisation at X, then measured losses between X and the detectors 
through the short arm. LX−C−D1(λl) varied by a factor of 11 over the input polarization, while LX−D0(λl) unex-
pectedly was independent of the input polarization. Using the measured loss values (listed in the last two rows in 
Table 1), we calculate the effective decrease in the afterpulsing probability in D1
δ δ= ×
= . × .
λ λ λ λ− − +
−
− − − − − −10
1 05 10 (5)
L L L L
1 0
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]/10
3
s s l lX C D1 X D0 X C D1 X D0
With afterpulsing amplitudes reduced by δ0 and δ1, we have repeated the simulation of the attack strategy pro-
posed in ref. 11. Let us first recap this strategy, in which Eve manipulates packets or ‘frames’13 of quantum signals 
traveling from Alice to Bob in the quantum channel. For instance, she may simply block the quantum signals 
for several contiguous time slots in a frame, thereby preventing any detection clicks (except those arising from 
dark counts) in Bob over a certain period of time. Conversely, she could substitute the quantum channel with a 
low-loss version to increase the detection probability in another group of slots. Such actions increase the efficacy 
of Eve’s attack; they provide her some control over when inside a frame Bob’s SPDs enter ‘deadtime’ – a period in 
which both D0 and D1 are insensitive to single photons and cannot register detection clicks. (In Clavis2, a 10 μs 
long deadtime is automatically triggered by a click in either of the detectors18). This is essentially done by attack-
ing in bursts, i.e., probing the phase modulator by sending bright THPs in a group of slots, thus making the SPDs 
enter deadtime as quickly as possible to let the afterpulses decay harmlessly and contribute as little as possible to 
the QBER. By balancing the usage of the low-loss line and the number of slots blocked per frame, Eve can also 
ensure that Bob does not notice any significant deviation of the observed detection rate (typically averaged over 
a large number of frames).
A numerical simulation modeling the above attack strategy during the operation of the QKD protocol is used 
to calculate Bob’s incurred QBER Q and Eve’s actual knowledge of the raw key IE
act. This is performed for different 
attack combinations, i.e., by varying the number of slots that are blocked or simply passed via the low-loss line 
(with or without accompanying THPs). If for at least one combination, IE
act exceeds the estimation IE
est from the 
security proof but Q < Qabort, the attack strategy is successful in breaching the security.
For an attack at λl, we have been able to find several such combinations for the given frame size of Nf = 1075 
slots and a quantum channel transmittance T = 0.25. For instance, in one such combination, a total of 433 slots 
out of Nf  are blocked by Eve. The remaining 642 slots pass from Alice to Bob via a low-loss line with 
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Figure 3. Afterpulse profiles at λs = 1536 nm and λl = 1924 nm. Note that the histograms are rescaled such that 
their peak counts and dark count rates match in the plot, making visual comparison of decay curves easy. The 
decay curves are similar but not identical. A total of 106 counts were histogrammed at each wavelength. The 
originally collected histogram data exhibited a saturation effect, in which count rate in later bins was slightly 
suppressed (by 6.4% for λs, 1.0% for λl) because of significant click probability in early bins. This has been 
corrected in the plotted histograms, increasing their total count number above 106.
λ (nm) μ ApC DC
1536 2.68 × 104 867760 162854
1924 8.32 × 107 44981 962140
Table 2. Counts due to thermal dark noise (DC) and afterpulsing (ApC), extracted from Fig. 3 and corrected for 
the saturation effect. (ApC + DC) is greater than 106 owing to this correction.
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transmittance TLL = 0.5, and out of them only 334 slots–periodically distributed in 12 bursts of 28 slots each inside 
the frame–are accompanied by THPs to read the modulation. With this attack combination, we were able to 
obtain = . > = .I I0 515 0 506E E
act est  (calculation based on Clavis2 parameters and the attack conditions11) and 
Q = 7.8% < Qabort ≈ 8% (empirically determined in ref. 21). We remark here that for a similar value of Q, the best 
optimized attacks at λs could not even yield .~I 0 080E
act . Furthermore, in contrast to the TLL = 0.9 used in ref. 11, 
implementing the attack strategy with TLL = 0.5 here makes the attack closer to be feasible in practice.
Note that in the simulation, we have mixed measurement results from two samples of Clavis2 system. The opti-
cal loss measurements at λl and the relative decrease in afterpulsing come from the system installed in Waterloo 
(Bob module serial number 08020F130), while the decay parameters of trap levels in avalanche photodiodes 
measured at λs come from the system in Erlangen (Bob module serial number 08008F130). The decay parameters 
and Z★ were measured at 1550 nm11, 18, which we consider to be close enough at our wavelength λs = 1536 nm.We 
further note that the latter figures vary significantly between D0 and D1, although the two avalanche photodiodes 
were of the same type and at the same temperature18. Therefore our simulation only gives a rough indication of 
attack performance. Results of the actual attack, if it is performed, will vary from sample to sample. However, also 
note that we have tested a single long wavelength of 1924; a different wavelength may well yield better attack per-
formance. Finally, more recent commercial systems deploy SPDs with much better efficiencies and afterpulsing 
characteristics and, as noted in ref. 11, this benefits the eavesdropping strategy.
We expect homodyne detection at 1924 nm to be easy to implement by using p-i-n diodes with extended 
infrared response22, 23. Based on the published specs, the latter should provide detection performance in our 
setting similar to that demonstrated at 1550 nm11. Separating Eve from Bob by some distance of fiber does not 
degrade the attack very fast; we have measured 7.5 dB/km loss at 1924 nm in a 16.5 cm diameter spool of Corning 
SMF-28e24 fiber.
The easiest countermeasure to protect the QKD system from this attack is to properly filter the light entering 
the system20, 25. E.g., adding a narrow-pass filter at Bob’s entrance will force Eve to use the signal wavelength λs 
and reduce her attack performance to the original failure, provided poor detector afterpulsing properties are 
maintained in production11. Another countermeasure would be to use a QKD protocol that does not require 
the receiver’s PM settings to be secret, such as BB84 with decoy states3, 10, 26. However, protecting the source’s PM 
settings will still be required in most QKD protocols25, 27.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have shown that despite the increased attenuation and sub-optimal phase modulation expe-
rienced around 1924 nm, the Trojan-horse attack performed at this wavelength has a very good chance of being 
invisible, because the afterpulsing experienced by Bob’s detectors is extremely low. This attack is mostly imple-
mentable with commercial off-the-shelf components. Therefore, an urgent need exists to incorporate effective 
countermeasures into practical QKD systems to thwart such threats.
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